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OPINION 
   
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 Alita Johnson, her son Haashim Johnson, and her 
stepfather Horace McCouellem died in a fire that engulfed their 
Philadelphia apartment. In the glare of hindsight, their deaths 
seem senseless. With the building already burning, Ms. 
Johnson called 911. A fire department operator instructed her 
to remain inside, promising help was on the way. But a cascade 
of errors followed: firefighters initially drove to the wrong 
location and then, once at the scene, never learned that Ms. 
Johnson and her family were waiting. So the firefighters 
extinguished the blaze without a search, leaving all three 
trapped in their home where they perished from smoke 
inhalation. Days would pass before firefighters returned and 
discovered their bodies.    
 
 Seeking answers and redress, the administratrix of the 
decedents’ estates sued the city and two fire department 
employees. Her claims rest largely on the theory that the 
defendants caused the deaths by making mistake after mistake. 
Few will deny the seriousness of those errors. Fewer still will 
deny that the grieving survivors deserve the peace that truth 
might bring. But not every injury has a legal remedy, and 
courts, particularly federal courts, may provide relief in limited 
circumstances. As those conditions do not exist here, we must 




I.  BACKGROUND 
We sketch the story behind this action by drawing from 
the allegations in the complaint. As we review a decision 
granting a motion to dismiss, we assume those allegations are 
true and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the 
plaintiff’s favor. See Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 174 n.1 
(3d Cir. 2018). 
 
A. The Johnson Family’s Death 
 
Ms. Johnson, her son, and her stepfather (here, for 
convenience, “the Johnson Family”) rented an apartment in a 
Philadelphia rowhome. Long before the fire, problems plagued 
the building. In 2014, the city’s Department of Licenses and 
Inspections sued the building’s owners, Granite Hill Properties 
LLC and Tyrone Duren, for illegally operating a boarding 
home. The owners agreed to vacate the property but later 
resumed renting to multiple tenants, including the Johnson 
Family. 
 
Late one evening in 2018, a fire ignited on the 
building’s second floor. Alita Johnson did what anyone would 
do and called 911. Once connected, the phone operator directed 
city firefighters to the address of the burning building. The 
incorrect address, it turns out, sending emergency responders 
the wrong way. In the meantime, 911 transferred Ms. Johnson 
to an operator with the Philadelphia Fire Department’s 
emergency call center (“Operator”). 
 
Ms. Johnson told the Operator that she and her family 
were inside the burning building, in a room on the rear third 
floor. The Operator gave clear guidance in response: shut the 
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door, place a towel across its bottom, and open a window. Ms. 
Johnson did as instructed. The Operator also encouraged Ms. 
Johnson to remain calm, explaining that rescuers were on the 
way. After a few minutes, for reasons unknown, the call 
disconnected. That was the last communication with the 
Johnson Family. 
 
 During the call, the Operator discovered the address 
error and relayed the correct address to a fire department 
dispatcher (“Dispatcher”), who rerouted the rescuers. But 
while the location of the fire was now correct, the scope of the 
emergency was not, since neither the Operator nor the 
Dispatcher told the firefighters that the Johnson Family was 
waiting inside the building. So the firefighters left after 
extinguishing the fire without ever looking for them. Days 
later, after relatives reported them missing, a full search of the 
building found their bodies, dead from smoke inhalation. 
 
B. The Federal Civil Action 
 
 Tamika Johnson, the administratrix of the Johnson 
Family’s estates (and the “Appellant”), then sued the Operator, 
the Dispatcher, the City of Philadelphia (“City”), and the City 
Fire Commissioner.1 The defendants moved to dismiss the 
 
1 The complaint also contained “special-relationship” 
claims against the Operator and the City, and an 
equal-protection claim against the City Fire Commissioner. 
The District Court dismissed these claims, and Appellant 
abandons them on appeal. In its dismissal order, the District 
Court granted Appellant leave to amend her equal-protection 




complaint and, after oral argument, the District Court granted 
their motion. This timely appeal followed. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
 Appellant claims that the Operator and the Dispatcher 
violated the Johnson Family’s constitutional rights under what 
is known as the “state-created danger” theory, and that the City 
violated those rights under the theory outlined in Monell v. 
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). She also 
claims that the City acted negligently under Pennsylvania law. 
The District Court held that Appellant failed to state any claim 
upon which relief could be granted. Finding no error, we will 
affirm.2  
 
Appellant confirmed that she does not seek leave to amend any 
of her other dismissed claims. 
2 The District Court had federal-question jurisdiction 
over the constitutional claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims under 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6), a District Court asks “whether, under any reasonable 
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to 
relief”—i.e., whether the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Kedra v. 
Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 440–41 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) 
and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s resolution of 
that question. Id. at 434.  
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A. State-Created Danger Claims 
 
 The District Court held that, as alleged, neither the 
Dispatcher nor the Operator was liable for the Johnson 
Family’s harm. Because the Dispatcher did not act 
affirmatively, and because the Operator’s behavior did not 
shock the conscience, we agree. 
 
1. Origin of the State-Created Danger Theory of 
Liability 
 
The state-created danger doctrine traces to a few words 
in the Supreme Court’s opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
Like the case here, the facts were disturbing. County officials 
allegedly learned of a father’s penchant for beating his son 
Joshua. Id. at 192–93. Rather than protect the defenseless child, 
the officials elected against intervening, and the dad’s final 
attack caused “brain damage so severe that [the boy was] 
expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution.” 
Id. at 193. Joshua and his mother then sued, alleging, novelly, 
that the officials’ failure to intervene violated the boy’s 
constitutional rights. Id. 
 
The Supreme Court rejected the claim. Such rights 
appear nowhere in the text of the Constitution, of course, and 
“the Due Process Clause[] generally confer[s] no affirmative 
right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be 
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which 
the government itself may not deprive the individual.” Id. at 
196. Rather, only “in certain limited circumstances” does “the 
Constitution impose[] upon the State affirmative duties of care 
and protection with respect to particular individuals,” such as 
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prisoners and the “involuntarily committed.” Id. at 198–99. In 
those cases, the State has taken an “affirmative act of 
restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf,” 
and that could be a “‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the 
protections of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 200. But there 
was not that kind of “special relationship” between the county 
and the young boy. Id. at 197, 201. Further, while the county 
“may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the 
free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do 
anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.” Id. at 
201. 
 
From those simple words—“played no part in their 
creation” and “render him any more vulnerable”—sprang a 
considerable expansion of the law. While seemingly not part 
of DeShaney’s holding, lower courts seized on those words to 
create a new remedy that would, it was thought, aid the next 
“[p]oor Joshua.”3 Thus was born the “state-created danger” 
 
3 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 
U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In his oft-
repeated dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun urged a 
“‘sympathetic’ reading” of the Constitution, “one which 
comports with dictates of fundamental justice.” Id. As the 
majority noted, victims like Joshua do deserve both sympathy 
and action, and  “[t]he people of Wisconsin may well prefer a 
system of liability which would place upon the State and its 
officials the responsibility for failure to act in situations such 
as the present one.” Id. at 203. But the Constitution does not 
permit the courts to “thrust” that remedy upon them by an 
“expansion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 




theory of liability, which we adopted in Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 
F.3d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir. 1996).4 There, a severely intoxicated 
husband and wife were walking home from a bar. Id. at 1201. 
Police officers stopped the couple, separated them, and 
allowed the man to continue on his way. Id. at 1201–02. The 
officers later “sent [the woman] home alone,” but she never 
made it; she was “found unconscious at the bottom of an 
embankment” the next day. Id. at 1202–03. The woman’s 
parents then sued, asserting that the officers had violated their 
daughter’s substantive due process rights. Id. at 1203. But there 
was no “special relationship” between the state and the 
decedent falling within DeShaney’s narrow holding. Id. at 
1205. 
 
Charting a new course, we elevated the commentary in 
DeShaney and discovered that the Court had “left open the 
possibility that a constitutional violation might . . . occur[]” 
when a state “play[s a] part in . . . creat[ing]” a danger or when 
it “render[s a person] more vulnerable to” that danger. Id. at 
1205 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201). Since the police 
separated the couple, “then sen[t the woman] home unescorted 
in a seriously intoxicated state in cold weather,” the state, 
through its actors, “made [her] more vulnerable to harm.” Id. 
 
“the Constitution is a written instrument” and “its meaning 
does not alter. That which it meant when adopted, it means 
now.” Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 822 (2011) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Rather, our Constitution reserves the virtue of 
sympathy to the people.  
4 Earlier cases “considered the possible viability” of the 
theory. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(collecting cases).  
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at 1209. The danger, we explained, was not the plaintiff’s 
intoxicated journey from tavern to domicile. Id. Rather, it was 
the “state-created danger” of removing her male companion, 
who presumably would have sheltered her from peril, that 
violated the guarantee of due process framed in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.5 Id. at 1211. 
 
2. The State-Created Danger Theory Today 
 
Several other Circuit Courts have also recognized the 
state-created danger theory of liability.6 But the Supreme Court 
 
5 Courts often treat the “state-created danger” doctrine 
“as if it were a rule of common law.” Weiland v. Loomis, 938 
F.3d 917, 920 (7th Cir. 2019). But it is not, and we must guard 
against reasoning that, especially with the best intentions, 
deviates from the Constitution’s careful balance of authority 
recognized in DeShaney. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 
327, 332 (1986) (“We have previously rejected reasoning that 
would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to 
be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be 
administered by the States.” (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 
693, 701 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
6 See, e.g., Doe v. Jackson Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 
954 F.3d 925, 932 (6th Cir. 2020); Martinez v. City of Clovis, 
943 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 2019); Estate of Her v. 
Hoeppner, 939 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019); Anderson ex rel. 
Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 934 F.3d 876, 881 (8th Cir. 
2019); Matthews v. Bergdorf, 889 F.3d 1136, 1150 (10th Cir. 
2018); Okin v. Village of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep’t., 
577 F.3d 415, 428 (2d Cir. 2009). But see Keller v. Fleming, 




has not.7 And the doctrine has not escaped criticism, since it 
does not stem from the text of the Constitution or any other 
positive law,8 and consequently vests open-ended lawmaking 
power in the judiciary.9 Moreover, the “state-created danger” 
 
never recognized th[e] ‘state-created-danger’ exception.”); 
Turner v. Thomas, 930 F.3d 640, 646 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e 
have never issued a published opinion recognizing a successful 
state-created danger claim.”); Irish v. Maine, 849 F.3d 521, 
526 (1st Cir. 2017) (“While this circuit has discussed the 
possible existence of the state-created danger theory, we have 
never found it applicable to any specific set of facts.”). One 
oddity of this reasoning is that it seems to create liability for 
the kind of action DeShaney did not. 
7 Nor is it certain to. See Collins v. City of Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“As a general matter, the 
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of 
substantive due process[.]”).  
8 See Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
597 F.3d 163, 188 (4th Cir. 2010) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) 
(“Neither the majority nor the parties point to any instance 
where Congress has laid down a rule to govern the conduct in 
this case, and it is wrong for a federal court to rush in where 
Congress has feared to tread.”) 
9 See Johnson, 597 F.3d at 184 (Wilkinson, J., 
concurring) (“Law exists in part to guard against the 
overreaching of public authority, and from that general purpose 
the life-tenured federal courts are not exempt. When the many 
cautionary maxims of restraint are toppled like dominos, the 
chances of judicial miscalculation exponentially increase. . . . 
Federal courts simply do not have a roving warrant to adopt 




doctrine offers little help to public employees seeking to better 
discharge their duties, and does not tell them “what to do, or 
avoid, in any situation.” Weiland v. Loomis, 938 F.3d 917, 919 
(7th Cir. 2019).  
 
But we remain bound to faithfully apply our precedent 
explaining the scope of the doctrine. As currently formulated, 
that requires a plaintiff to plead four elements: first, 
foreseeable and fairly direct harm; second, action marked by 
“a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience”; third, a 
relationship with the state making the plaintiff a foreseeable 
victim, rather than a member of the public in general; and 
fourth, an affirmative use of state authority in a way that 
created a danger, or made others more vulnerable than had the 
state not acted at all. See Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning, 
 
of substantive due process.”); Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington 
Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 874 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(Higginson, J., concurring) (noting the “loose articulation” of 
the state-created danger doctrine); cf. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125 
(“[G]uideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this 
unchartered area [of substantive due process] are scarce and 
open-ended. The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us 
to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break 
new ground in this field.”) (citation omitted); see also Kedra v. 
Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 462 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t is troubling how far we have expanded 
substantive due process . . . .”); Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 
160, 186 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Ambro, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“Federal courts cannot be the 
forum for every complaint that a government actor could have 
taken an alternate course that would have avoided harm to one 
of our citizens.”). 
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905 F.3d 711, 717 (3d Cir. 2018). We apply that precedent to 
the facts Appellant pleads here. 
 
3. The Dispatcher Did Not Affirmatively Use Her 
Authority 
 
The state-created danger theory requires Appellant to 
allege that the Dispatcher “affirmatively used . . . her authority 
in a way that created a danger to the [decedents] or that 
rendered [them] more vulnerable to a danger than had [the 
Dispatcher] not acted at all”—i.e., to allege an affirmative act. 
L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Bright v. Westmoreland, 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 
2006)). True, we have noted the “inherent difficulty in drawing 
a line between an affirmative act and a failure to act,” and 
sometimes frame the inquiry as asking whether a defendant’s 
“exercise of authority resulted in a departure from th[e] status 
quo.” Id. at 242–43. But we have repeatedly held that an 
alleged failure to do something, standing alone, cannot be the 
basis for a state-created danger claim. See, e.g., Burella v. City 
of Phila., 501 F.3d 134, 146–47 (3d Cir. 2007) (police officers’ 
failure to intervene in domestic-violence situation did not 
satisfy element four).  
 
 Here, there are no allegations of affirmative conduct by 
the Dispatcher that caused the Johnson Family’s harms. 
Rather, Appellant claims only that the Dispatcher failed to 
communicate the Johnson Family’s location to the 
firefighters.10 But this is a classic allegation of omission, a 
 
10 (App. at 56 (“[The] Dispatcher violated the 




failure to do something—in short, a claim of inaction and not 
action. That is not enough under our prior decisions, and so we 
will affirm the dismissal of that claim. 
 
4. The Operator’s Alleged Actions Did Not Shock 
the Conscience 
 
Appellant alleges that the Operator violated the Johnson 
Family’s constitutional rights by “directing them to close 
themselves inside the burning building’s 3rd floor rear room, 
assuring them that [f]irefighters were coming to their rescue, 
but then failing inexplicably to inform the [f]irefighters of 
[their] existence, location, or need of rescue.” (App. at 54.) The 
District Court held that those allegations do not “shock the 
conscience,” as that phrase is defined in our precedent. We 
agree. 
 
Start with the standard, recognizing that it offers little 
light. See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 
1973) (noting the shock-the-conscience test “is not one that can 
be applied by a computer, [but] it at least points the way”), 
quoted in Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 
(1998). We have explained that “[t]he exact level of culpability 
required to shock the conscience . . . depends on the 
circumstances of each case, and the threshold for liability 
varies with the state actor’s opportunity to deliberate before 
taking action.” Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 437 (3d Cir. 
2017). In “‘hyperpressurized environments requiring a snap 
judgment,’ an official must actually intend to cause harm in 
 
inexplicably to inform the Firefighters of decedents’ existence, 




order to be liable.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Vargas v. 
City of Phila., 783 F.3d 962, 973 (3d Cir. 2015)). “In situations 
in which the state actor is required to act ‘in a matter of hours 
or minutes,’ . . . the state actor [must] ‘disregard a great risk of 
serious harm.’” Id. (quoting Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 
310 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). “And where the actor has 
time to make an ‘unhurried judgment[],’ a plaintiff need only 
allege facts supporting an inference that the official acted with 
a mental state of ‘deliberate indifference.’” Id. (alteration 
omitted) (quoting Sanford, 456 F.3d at 309). 
 
The District Court believed that the Operator faced 
“emergency circumstances,” so the intent-to-cause-harm 
standard applied. (App. at 24.) On appeal, Appellant argues for 
a lower standard. But the claim fails even under the deliberate-
indifference test. Consider the Operator’s instructions and 
assurances. Sheltering in place rather than risking a perilous 
descent through a raging fire mirrors standard practices. As for 
the promises of timely help, Appellant notes that the Johnson 
Family “forwent attempting to escape the burning building 
by . . . another rear window that opened onto a flat, walkable 
roof.” (App. at 51.) But she does not allege that the Operator 
knew about this means of escape.  
 
 The Operator’s failure to communicate the decedents’ 
location and need of rescue is also insufficient.11 “[T]he Due 
 
11 Were this failure the sole basis of Appellant’s claim 
against the Operator, we would affirm the dismissal of this 
claim for the same reason as the claim against the Dispatcher—
i.e., for failure to allege an affirmative act. Appellant, however, 




Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of 
an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, 
or property.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); 
cf. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“[C]laims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some 
more culpable state of mind, do not constitute ‘deliberate 
indifference.’ . . . We have found ‘deliberate indifference’ . . . 
where [a] prison official . . . knows of a prisoner’s need for 
medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it.” 
(emphasis added)). Appellant does not allege that the Operator 
intentionally declined to relay the decedents’ location to the 
[f]irefighters. Instead, she argues the Operator “fail[ed] 
inexplicably to inform the firefighters of the decedents’ 
 
rights “by a combination” of the instructions, assurances, and 
the failure to communicate. (App. at 54.) Because we hold that 
Appellant’s claim against the Operator does not satisfy element 
two of the state-created danger theory, we need not determine 
whether a combination of affirmative acts and omissions 
satisfies element four. Cf. Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 
181, 197 (3d Cir. 2004) (where EMTs falsely told police that 
man assaulted them, element four satisfied by, for example, 
EMTs’ later failure to advise police about the man’s medical 
condition and decision to “abandon control over the 
situation”). But see Walter v. Pike Cty., 544 F.3d 182, 195–96 
(3d Cir. 2008) (under state-created danger theory, a 
defendant’s affirmative act does not impose a later duty to act 
if the initial act did not shock the conscience); id. at 196 
(“[T]hese findings would not amount to a constitutional 
violation—they would not establish that the defendants 
committed a culpable act, only that they acted in 2001 and 
then, months later, shocked the conscience through inaction.”). 
And we need not address elements one and three. 
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existence, location, or need of rescue.” (App. at 54 (emphasis 
added).) But the only reasonable inference is that the Operator 
neglected to relay that information through error, omission, or 
oversight. Nothing in the complaint or, indeed, ordinary 
experience supports the inference that the Operator 
deliberately chose to discard her concern for the Johnson 
Family’s lives. For that reason, Appellant’s claim against the 
Operator does not satisfy element two of the state-created 
danger theory.12 So we will affirm the dismissal of that claim.  
 
B. Monell Claim 
 
 What of the City of Philadelphia’s role in this tragedy? 
Appellant argues that the alleged calamity of errors that 
followed Alita Johnson’s desperate call traces to the City’s 
failure to provide “guidelines, policies, or training to its [fire 
department] operator[s] or dispatcher[s] regarding the 
communication of vital information to the caller requiring 
emergency assistance, or to the [f]irefighters responding to the 
 
12 Appellant did not allege that the Dispatcher 
intentionally declined to relay the decedents’ location to the 
firefighters, either. (See App. at 56 (alleging that the 
Dispatcher “fail[ed] inexplicably to inform the [f]irefighters of 
the decedents’ existence, location, or need of rescue”).) When 
dismissing the claim against the Dispatcher, the District Court 
also concluded that, as alleged, the Dispatcher’s behavior did 
not shock the conscience. For the reasons discussed above, that 
conclusion was sound, and is another basis for dismissing the 
claim against the Dispatcher. We decline to determine whether 
this claim satisfies elements one and three of the state-created 
danger theory.  
17 
 
scene.” (App. at 59.) That failure, Appellant argues, violates 
the Johnson Family’s constitutional rights.  
 
 We begin by noting what is not argued: that 
Philadelphia is always responsible for the conduct of its 
employees. Rather, as is well established, a municipality is not 
liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees just 
because of their employment, under a respondeat superior 
theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. But it may be liable if a 
plaintiff “demonstrate[s] that the violation of rights was caused 
by the municipality’s policy or custom.” Thomas v. 
Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). If the 
alleged policy or custom at issue is a failure to train or 
supervise (as it is here), the plaintiff must show that this failure 
“amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of persons 
with whom [the municipality’s] employees will come into 
contact.” Id. (quoting Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 
357 (3d Cir. 1999)). “Ordinarily,” this requires a plaintiff to 
identify a “‘pattern of similar constitutional violations by 
untrained employees’” that “puts municipal decisionmakers on 
notice that a new program is necessary . . . .” Id. at 223 (quoting 
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). Otherwise, the 
plaintiff needs to show that failure to provide the identified 
training would “likely . . . result in the violation of 
constitutional rights”—i.e., to show that “the need for more or 
different training [was] so obvious.” City of Canton v. Harris, 
489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). 
 
 Appellant does not allege a history of similar problems 
at the fire department. Nor is it obvious that fire department 
personnel would intentionally withhold important information 
from the firefighters. Accidents occur, of course. But the 
Monell inquiry asks whether a municipality was deliberately 
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indifferent to the risk of a constitutional violation. See Thomas, 
749 F.3d at 222 (“[L]iability under section 1983 requires a 
showing that the failure [to train] amounts to ‘deliberate 
indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom [the 
municipality’s] employees will come into contact.” (emphasis 
added) (quoting Carter, 181 F.3d at 357)). And as already 
noted, negligent behavior does not violate the Constitution 
under the state-created danger theory. That is why we see no 
error in the District Court’s conclusion that Appellant has not 
plausibly alleged that the City was deliberately indifferent to 
anyone’s substantive due process rights. We will therefore 
affirm the dismissal of her Monell claim.13 
 
13 The District Court believed that Appellant’s inability 
to state a claim against an individual City employee meant that 
she could not state a Monell claim against the City. In Fagan 
v. City of Vineland, we held that “an underlying constitutional 
tort can still exist even if no individual [employee] violated the 
Constitution.” 22 F.3d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir. 1994). But we later 
“carefully confined Fagan to its facts: a substantive due 
process claim resulting from a police pursuit.” Grazier ex rel. 
White v. City of Phila., 328 F.3d 120, 124 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003); 
see also Vargas v. City of Phila., 783 F.3d 962, 974–75 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (“Because the officers did not violate any of her 
constitutional rights, . . . there was no violation for which the 
City of Philadelphia could be held responsible.”); City of Los 
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam) 
(holding that Monell does not “authorize[] the award of 
damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions 
of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that 
the officer inflicted no constitutional harm”). At least two of 




C. Negligence Claims 
 
 Finally, Appellant alleges that the City simply ignored 
the history of problems at the Johnson Family’s residence, by 
failing to fix the building’s fire hazards and failing to stop the 
building owners’ practices. The District Court held that the 
City was immune from these negligence claims because it had 
insufficient control over the building. Under the relevant 
Commonwealth law, we agree.  
 
 In Pennsylvania, municipalities are “generally . . . 
immune from tort liability.” Brewington ex rel. Brewington v. 
City of Phila., 199 A.3d 348, 350 (Pa. 2018); see 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 8541. But immunity does not extend to injuries caused 
by negligence in “[t]he care, custody or control of real property 
in the [municipality’s] possession[.]” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 8542(b)(3). This real-property exception is “narrowly 
construed,” Brewington, 199 A.3d at 356, with liability arising 
only when the agency has “total control over the premises,” 
Sweeney v. Merrymead Farm, Inc., 799 A.2d 972, 977 (Pa. 
 
municipality may be “independently liable for a substantive 
due process violation” even if no municipal employee is liable. 
See Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam); Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Health Emergency Med. Servs. 
Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 482 (3d Cir. 2003). But both 
opinions note that, for Monell liability to attach, “there must 
still be a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” 
Sanford, 456 F.3d at 314; Brown, 318 F.3d at 482. As 
Appellant’s Monell claim fails in any event, we need not wade 
into this discussion. See Brown, 318 F.3d at 475 n.1 (“We may 




Commw. Ct. 2002); see id. (“[L]imited control or mere 
occupation for a limited period of time is insufficient to impose 
liability.”). 
 
 Appellant argues that the City, by exercising its 
regulatory power, “essentially divested the building owners of 
their legal possession of the property and assumed 
responsibility for its legal control and occupancy.” (Reply Br. 
at 20 (emphasis omitted).) But she pleads no facts supporting 
this theory. She does not allege, for example, that the City 
physically occupied the building or let others do so. Her 
complaint, in fact, suggests the opposite. (See App. at 65 
(alleging that the City “failed to prevent” the owners from 
re-occupying the building (emphasis added)).) 
 
 Because Appellant has not plausibly alleged that the 
City had “total control” over the decedents’ building, she 
cannot rely on the real-property exception to overcome the 
City’s immunity. We will therefore affirm the dismissal of her 
negligence claims. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The deaths of Alita Johnson, Haashim Johnson, and 
Horace McCouellem should give all pause. Three lives were 
lost inside a building long-known to flout safety requirements, 
amid a bungled rescue effort. One hopes their deaths focus the 
will and resolve of those able to act. But the City and its 
employees may be held liable under the state-created danger 
theory, and under Pennsylvania tort law, only in narrowly 
defined circumstances. Because those circumstances are not 
met here, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
Appellant’s complaint.  
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MATEY, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I write separately to join Judge Porter’s view that our 
full Court should revisit the state-created danger doctrine. As 
our majority opinion states, the doctrine does not “stem from 
the text of the Constitution or any other positive law.” Maj. Op. 
II.A.2. The doctrine “offers little help to public employees 
seeking to better discharge their duties,” id., but subjects them 
to lawsuits for alleged constitutional violations. As Judge 
Porter notes, the doctrine exemplifies a “troubling” expansion 
of substantive due process. Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 
462 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J., concurring). Many state-created 
danger cases are tragic and unsettling and this matter is no 
exception. But the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “does not transform every tort committed by a 
state actor into a constitutional violation.” DeShaney v. 
Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 
(1989). Because “[t]he place to make new legislation . . . lies 
in Congress,” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1753 
(2020), I join Judge Porter’s call for our full Court to revisit the 
state-created danger doctrine. 
PORTER, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I join the majority’s opinion in full. But I write 
separately to explain my view that our full Court should revisit 
the state-created danger doctrine.  
First, “it is troubling how far we have expanded 
substantive due process” in this area. Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 
F.3d 424, 462 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J., concurring). As Judge 
Fisher noted in his concurrence in Kedra, we have gone much 
further than the Supreme Court by “fashioning” our own state-
created danger doctrine and further still by “stating that there 
could be liability in non-custodial situations for gross 
negligence.” Id. (citations omitted). As the majority opinion 
observes, the state-created danger doctrine “has not escaped 
criticism, since it does not stem from the text of the 
Constitution or any other positive law.” Maj. Op. at 11. I agree 
that, “[g]iven that our substantive due process doctrine has 
gradually lowered the bar for bringing a [state-created danger] 
claim, it may be time for this full Court to reexamine the 
doctrine.” Kedra, 876 F.3d at 462 (Fisher, J., concurring). 
 Assuming the continuing viability of the state-created 
danger doctrine in our Circuit, the full Court should 
nevertheless revisit our test for analyzing whether a state 
actor’s behavior “shocks the conscience.” In Kedra, Judge 
Krause skillfully synthesized our precedent into a three-part 
framework. First, “[i]n hyperpressurized environments 
requiring a snap judgment, an official must actually intend to 
cause harm in order to be liable.” Id. (quoting Vargas v. City 
of Phila., 783 F.3d 962, 973 (3d Cir. 2015)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
Second, “[i]n situations in which the state actor is 
required to act in a matter of hours or minutes, we require that 
the state actor disregard a great risk of serious harm.” Id. 
(emphasis added) (quoting Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 310 
(3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). And third, when “the [state] actor has time to make 
an unhurried judgment, a plaintiff need only allege facts 
supporting an inference that the official acted with a mental 
state of deliberate indifference.” Id. (quoting Sanford, 456 F.3d 
at 309) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have described 
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“deliberate indifference” as a “conscious disregard of a 
substantial risk of serious harm,” id. (emphasis added) 
(quoting Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973–74) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), and also as “a willingness to ignore a 
foreseeable danger or risk.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 910 (3d Cir. 
1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 Our precedent asks district courts to differentiate among 
the three tiers of culpability and apply them to a set of facts.1 
That is no simple task. But it is further complicated by the 
mystifying differences we have drawn between the second and 
third tiers of culpability. In my view, there is no practical 
difference between a “disregard of a great risk of serious harm” 
(the second tier) and a “conscious disregard of a substantial 
risk of serious harm” (the third tier). Compare Great, The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/81104 (last visited 
September 1, 2020) (“Of considerable importance, 
significance, or distinction; important, weighty; distinguished, 
prominent; famous, renowned; impressive.”), with Substantial, 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary  
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/193050 (last visited 
September 1, 2020) (“[O]f real significance, weighty; reliable; 
important, worthwhile.”). But a “great” or “substantial” risk is 
obviously weightier than a merely “foreseeable” risk—
regardless of whether that “foreseeable” risk is willfully 
ignored. Our explication of the second and third tiers is 
inconsistent and nearly incoherent. That is not surprising, 
however, because “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking 
in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” Collins v. 
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). 
 Assuming we continue to recognize the state-created 
danger doctrine at all, I suggest combining the second and third 
tiers into one and making the inquiry more straightforward: For 
 
1 When discerning whether deliberately indifferent conduct 
shocks the conscience, the Supreme Court has said that the 
question is fact dependent because “deliberate indifference that 
shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in 




a state actor to be liable in a “hyperpressurized environment 
requiring a snap judgment,” he must actually intend to cause 
harm. But in any other context, the state actor must act with 
deliberate indifference that shocks the conscience. This 
articulation of the standard hews more closely to Supreme 
Court precedent,2 is more consistent with the tests established 
by our sister circuits that have adopted the state-created danger 
doctrine,3 and does not ask state actors like the operator and 
dispatcher in this case to ponder the gradations among a 
“substantial risk,” a “great risk,” and a “foreseeable danger”  
before reacting to an urgent 911 call. 
I respectfully offer these brief observations about our 
state-created danger doctrine and hope that in an appropriate 
case we will revisit the doctrine as a full Court.  
 
2 See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836, 847 n.8 (holding that liability 
will attach when a state actor’s conduct is “so egregious, so 
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the 
contemporary conscience”). 
3 See, e.g., Doe v. Jackson Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 954 
F.3d 925, 932–33 (6th Cir. 2020); Estate of Her v. Hoeppner, 
939 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019); Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-
on-Hudson Police Dep’t., 577 F.3d 415, 431–32 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
